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Arguing the Point: 
Should Large-Scale Power Projects Have a
Future under the CDM? 
A debate by Axel Michaelowa (University of Zurich/Perspectives)
 
and Michael Lazarus (Stockholm Environment Institute)
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Large-scale infrastructure and power plant CDM projects have long at­tracted criticism. Examples include large hydropower projects and in­vestment in more efficient coal-fired power stations. There is dispute
– not least on the CDM Executive Board itself – whether such projects can
reliably demonstrate additionality. Given the size of the funding involved,
plant lifetime and the small impact on the projects’ rate of return, many
commentators question if CDM can really be the key break-even factor. 
Against this backdrop, we invited two highly regarded CDM experts to set out their
stance on whether large-scale power projects should be generally excluded from the
CDM. Both authors have advised the High Level Panel with expert reports. 
Dr. Axel Michaelowa 
has worked in international 
climate policy since 1994. He
combines research and 
practice, the former at the
University of Zurich and the
latter at Perspectives, a con­
sultancy launched in 2003. He
has worked on a large num­
ber of approved CDM metho­
dologies and has been a
member of the CDM Execu­
tive Board’s Registration and
Issuance Team. 
Do not throw out the child 
with the bathwater! 
Axel Michaelowa 
The recent tendency of industrialized countries to fight against large­
scale project types in the CDM is disturbing. First credits from industrial 
gas projects were banned in 
all relevant jurisdictions. 
Now large power projects 
are targeted. Arguments are 
no longer as simple as in the context of the industrial gas projects 
where the perverse incentive to increase production in developing coun­
tries to the detriment of production in industrialized countries was the 
major issue. NGO representatives say that fossil power plant projects in 
the CDM lead to a perpetuation of emissions from the power sector. A 
recent policy brief by Michael Lazarus, Pete Erickson and Randall Spald­
ing-Fecher  argues that additionality of large projects is generally diffi­
cult to demonstrate. I disagree. If policymakers were willing to apply the 
same criteria that banks apply to loan requests, they could objectively 
differentiate between business-as-usual projects and those projects 
mobilized by the revenue from CER sales. Here the key issue is the 
assumed price of CERs. Under the current rock-bottom prices, no new 
project can seriously claim additionality, as revenue after deduction of 
transaction costs is close to zero. But in the past, when the majority of 
CDM projects was planned, developers expected prices ranging between 
4 and 20 ¤/CER, which were then frequently fixed in forward purchase 
contracts. At such prices, CER revenues could make a difference, and 
have so in a number of countries. The generic argument that the change 
in the internal rate of return has to surpass a specific threshold also 
does not take into account that entrepreneurs do react on small incen­
tives, if they are able to hedge for variations in other relevant parame­
ters. 
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Michael’s claim that all large power projects 
should be excluded also does not take into 
account that attractiveness of renewable energy 
projects strongly depends on site characteristics. 
The CDM should have the purpose to mobilize 
projects that are not commercially attractive on 
their own. Hydro projects in areas with variable 
rainfall or wind projects with a low average wind­
speed should not be compared with projects in 
hugely attractive sites. Likewise biomass power 
projects in areas with high prices for biomass 
residues cannot be compared with those that get 
residues for free. 
Instead of banning large power projects in gen­
eral, a much more urgent problem that policy­
makers need to resolve is the question whether 
lavish renewable energy subsidies should con­
tinue to be ignored in the additionality assess­
ments. Their exclusion was sensible in the early 
days of the carbon market when only a small 
number of countries had renewable energy subsi­
dies. Then, it could be rightly feared that the risk 
to lose CER revenues would lead to a delay in 
introducing renewable energy support policies. 
Now, as many countries have such policies in 
place and have reaped CER revenues, the situation 
has changed. I would propose to no longer 
exempt support policies from the additionality 
assessment five years after their introduction. 
India and China having policies in place for many 
years can easily be “weaned off” the CER subsidy. 
Then, the majority of problematic cases would 
vanish in one go. 
We need to have a clear view: either we want the 
market mechanisms like the CDM to drive large­
scale mitigation, or they will become irrelevant. 
This cannot be achieved if we throw out all proj­
ect types that achieve large-scale mitigation. A 
differentiated approach is needed. Only then mar­
kets can really mobilize the lowest cost reduc­
tions. 
Michael Lazarus 
has over 20 years of profes­
sional experience in energy
and environmental analysis.
His research focuses on 
energy and climate change
policy, carbon markets and
offsets, and state and local 
climate change initiatives in
the United States. He has 
been involved in developing a
large number of CDM metho­
dologies and from 2002 to
2007 was a member of the 
CDM Methodology Panel. 
Maybe this kid has become too big

for the bathtub! 
Or to invoke a rather different idiom (and image), 
perhaps large-scale power projects have become 
the elephant in the CDM room.  For years, 
Michael Lazarus 
researchers have expressed concerns about the 
additionality of large, new, wind, hydro, natural 
gas, and coal projects, while policy makers have 
been reluctant to systematically address them. 
Analysts have shown that CDM revenues, even in 
good times, typically have a relatively small effect 
on the expected return of power sector projects 
(e.g.,  ~3% for wind and hydropower), often much 
smaller than normal fluctuations in other factors 
such as fuel prices or electricity tariffs.  They have 
asserted that many power technologies in the 
CDM pipeline should be considered common prac­
tice, as their implementation is now widespread 
(e.g., hydroelectricity, wind, and higher-efficiency 
coal technologies). Furthermore, often, these 
technologies receive extensive government sup­
port in the form of feed-in-tariffs, other incentives, 
and mandates, designed to address local priorities 
such as energy security that are not taken into 
account in CDM decisions.  
Last year, Pete Erickson, Randall Spalding-Fecher, 
and I conducted research that considered the 
extent to which the value and integrity of the CDM 
hinges upon the net emissions impact of these 
large-scale power supply projects If the large 
majority of these projects are additional and oper­
ate well beyond the credit issuance period, we 
found, they could lead to a net decrease in global 
greenhouse gas emissions. However, if they are 
mostly non-additional, as research has suggested , 
the use of CERs from these projects could increase 
global greenhouse gas emissions by over a gigaton 
of CO2e, cumulatively through 2020.  Furthermore, 
over this same period, it turns out that the effective 
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functioning of the CDM is at risk because of an excess 
supply of CERs of a similar magnitude.
“Transitioning away from large-scale
CDM projects could help address the
over-supply of CERs” M. Lazarus 
In an SEI policy brief, we proposed a simple solution: 
transitioning the CDM away from large-scale power 
supply projects. We argued that moving away from 
large-scale CDM projects could not only improve the 
CDM’s overall mitigation impact, it could help address 
the over-supply of certified emission reductions 
(CERs), support projects that truly depend on CERs, 
and provide the opportunity to focus on more effec­
tive support mechanisms for lower-carbon power in 
the developing world (supported NAMAs and scaled­
up crediting and trading mechanisms, for example). 
We have cautioned that such a transition would need 
to be carefully considered, bearing in mind gover­
nance and legal aspects and the need for maintaining 
investor confidence.  Nonetheless, we feel that the 
time is right to give this idea serious consideration. 
The CDM is undergoing some seriously soul-searching. 
And new market mechanisms are being asked not 
merely to deliver efficiency and environmentally 
integrity, but a net decrease in global GHG emissions 
as well. 
1 For further discussion of this research, as well as the fuller ratio­
nale behind our findings and recommendations, see our policy
brief http://sei-us.org/publications/id/468 as well as the underly­
ing analysis in Chapter 4 of the CDM Policy Dialogue report, As­
sessing the Impact of the CDM
http://www.cdmpolicydialogue.org/research/1030_impact.pdf 
What about other remedies? As for additionality, one 
could seek further improvements to additionality 
tests, such as the greater use of standardized methods 
or better investment additionality tests that consider 
the impact of CER revenues, as Axel suggests.  How­
ever, these ideas have been around for as long as the 
CDM, and have yet to succeed for several fundamental 
reasons (low signal-to-noise ratios, information 
assymetries, and so on). A differentiated approach 
that identifies specific conditions in which the CDM is 
more likely to be a decisive factor for large-scale 
power project, as Axel suggests, might work, but such 
an approach is difficult to develop, defend, and 
approve.  Changing the treatment of domestic subsidy 
policies in additionality assessment, as Axel also sug­
gests, could be a double-edged sword that dissuades 
positive domestic policies in countries other than 
China and India and in sectors other than power.  As for 
addressing the excess supply of CERs, some have rec­
ommended using a fund to buy and then cancel CERs. 
However, this remedy would be costly, could divert cli­
mate finance from other mitigation or adaptation 
activities, and would not address fundamental risks to 
environmental integrity. 
Transitioning away from large-scale power projects in 
the CDM would not require new finance, or divert 
existing flows. It would help steer investment to proj­
ect types with more certain additionality, including 
some that could actually help achieve a net decrease 
in global emissions through application of a discount 
or other mechanism. The phase-out of large power 
sector projects could be implemented by either CDM 
administrators (EB/CMP) and through a coordinated 
effort among major buyer-country governments, and 
in a manner that leaves large-scale power supply CERs 
that are already issued and held by actors in the car­
bon market in play. 
I understand the discomfort with the suggestion to 
consider moving away from project types that are 
expected to generate the majority of CERs going for­
ward. I have played a key role in developing the CDM 
methodology that underlies most of them (ACM0002 
and its offspring), and thus feel some responsibility for 
the issues it has created. Indeed, as Axel suggests, 
there are bright spots –many power projects that, 
most likely, the CDM has helped bring to the market – 
though for CDM to work as intended these would have 
to be rule not the exceptions. Furthermore, CDM in 
the power sector has helped to create institutions and 
human capacities that can have lasting value in a tran­
sition to low-carbon power systems.  But it is time to 
Carbon Mechanisms Review 01/2013 
17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
take stock of these successes, and as the CDM High 
Level Panel has suggested, time to “graduate” some 
project types from the CDM.  After a decade, without 
confidence that a large majority of large-scale CDM 
power projects are additional, they should be consid­
ered next in line for graduation to other policy mecha­
nisms that can be more ambitious, efficient, and effec­
tive. 
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Give project-based market mechanisms
the chance to work! 
Axel Michaelowa 
Michael puts his finger on relevant challenges of the 
CDM market. It is clear that at low CER prices it is diffi­
cult to assess whether the CER revenue has mobilized a 
project or not. But this is a problem which is due to the 
lack of political will to set stringent emissions targets 
and to allow CERs to contribute towards those targets. 
Low signal to noise ratios are not a design problem of 
the CDM. At a price of 50 ¤/CER, it would be easy to sep-
arate black and white sheep. At 50 cents/CER, it is of 
course virtually impossible! I agree with Michael that a 
CER stabilization fund is not a viable remedy as it 
would generate a short-term price spike that would 
eventually fade unless sustainable CER demand is gen­
erated. 
I think that information asymmetries can be tackled in 
the assessment of additionality. If banks are able to 
find out which projects are promising and which ones 
are not, regulators should also be able to do so. This of 
course would mean that validations – which have 
already substantially improved – need to improve fur­
ther. This would require clear liability for wrong valida­
tions. The World Bank’s push to do 
away with validation, which has been 
endorsed by a number of govern­
ments would lead us down the wrong 
road. 
I agree with Michael that a reform of the CDM to con­
tribute to global emission reductions is necessary, as 
we cannot continue to generate 100% offsets if we 
want to reach emissions paths compatible with the 2°C 
target. Discounting of CERs, ideally linked to the degree 
of development of the host country would be an ideal 
means to generate such reductions, and incentivize 
taking up commitments.This would allow us to “wean 
countries off” the CDM in an objective and transparent 
procedure.The solution which I propose regarding 
treating renewable energy subsidies in the additional­
ity test would fit neatly into this strategy, as it makes 
clear that countries cannot expect to generate CER rev­
enues forever.
In the medium term, we should see a coexistence of 
the CDM with new, more highly aggregated market 
mechanisms.The key outcome should be that project­
based mechanisms do not prevent graduation of host 
countries to take up emission caps. I hope that within 
the next decade all mitigation possibilities that can be 
envisaged are mobilized by one of the market mecha­
nisms, and that no options are excluded ex ante. 
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